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The ‘questionableness’ of things: opening up the conversation 
 
Alison Buckley, Andy Cheng, Sue Dymoke, Jon Nixon, Jane Spiro and Jonathan Vincent 
 
This chapter developed from a number of conversations that took place at the 4th 
International Conference on Value and Virtue in Practice-Based Research the twin themes of 
which were ‘openness’ and ‘criticality’. These chance and often fleeting conversations 
focused on ideas explored in the keynote address that Jon delivered at the conference, but 
spanned out into a wider discussion of the relevance of those ideas within different arenas of 
professional practice.  
 After the conference we agreed via email that Alison, Andy, Jane, Jonathan and Sue 
would respond – from their different perspectives and value orientations – to the ideas 
explored in Jon’s keynote.  How might these ideas translate into professional practice? How 
might embedded practice speak back to the generality of these ideas? How do the ideas relate 
to our core values as educators involved in practice-based research?  
 These were our starting points. They have resulted in the following edited version of 
Jon’s original address interlaced with questions and interjections from the co-authors of this 
chapter. We are not claiming that what follows is dialogical, but it does attempt to open up a 
conversation on the nature of understanding and what it means to be someone who seeks to 
understand.  
 Jon began his address with a quotation from the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer: 
And what is hermeneutical imagination? It is a sense of the questionableness of something 
and what this requires of us (Gadamer, 2004, 41-42).  
 
I’d like to approach the twin themes of openness and criticality through a consideration of 
what I call the interpretive tradition: the tradition, that is, of philosophical hermeneutics. 
Hermes was the son of Zeus and the god of transitions and boundaries. He acted as the 
messenger and emissary of Zeus, traversing the space between the mortal and divine, the 
human world and Mount Olympus. It is in this in-between space – the transitional space 
where meaning is made and boundaries transgressed – that philosophical hermeneutics is 
located.  
 
Jane: In-between space is what interests me as an educator and communicator. In 
Dante’s Purgatorio there is a limbo land which is a reverse image of the terraces of 
heaven.  For him it was a kind of hell to be in an ‘in between’ place without the 
capacity to travel to or from; to be caught without movement between two 
conditions. I interpret this for myself, as an educator, as a metaphor for creative 
opportunity. If the space between people is seen as the chance to travel between, we 
have so much to learn from one another; if it is seen as a ‘gap’ we are separated 
from one another in lonely and threatening limbo-lands.  When I arrived as a new 
teacher in a country where I knew neither the language nor anyone in my new 
community, I wrote a sequence of poems I called Exile: 
 I am a changeling, plucked  
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and wrongly placed, my history  
mute, a failure to know  
where I am going, to remember where from. 
I empathise here with the experience of physically entering these ‘in-between’ 
spaces, as an exile, refugee, traveller, plucked from a first language and culture. The 
need to cross emotional, linguistic and physical space is urgent.  As a teacher of 
second culture students I have always considered it my responsibility to recognise 
this ‘in-between’ space and to ensure it is a journey towards transformation, rather 
than a place in which to be lost.   
 
 To interpret is to seek meaning. We human beings have always searched for meaning. 
We have looked to the stars to divine our destinies. We have looked at the footprints in the 
sand to see who passed this way before us. We have noted in the flight of birds the passing of 
the seasons. But alongside this primary practice of interpretation has evolved the secondary 
practice of understanding what it is we are doing when we interpret. Rabbis have asked: 
‘What are we doing when we interpret the Talmud and the Torah?’ Philosophers of law have 
asked: ‘What are we doing when we interpret the Law?’ Humanist scholars have asked: 
‘What are we doing when we interpret the Text?’  
 
Jane: The image of the footprints in the sand evokes for me a Joshua Indian creation 
myth. The Creator/First mover in the story creates the earth through rings of smoke, 
and brings land out of the water. But to his horror, as the sand lifts from the sea, 
there is a line of footprints clearly imprinted. No matter how many times he washes 
the sand with sea, each time it re-emerges with the footprints. Even the First mover, 
believing himself to be the originator of all, has a predecessor. Behind each of our 
movements, is another; it is simply that we are still unaware.  I see hermeneutics as 
the process of becoming aware, returning to those footsteps again and again to 
realise they are in fact ours, as well as those of our known and hidden ancestors.  
 
The interpretive tradition 
Two insights in particular form the basis of what I am terming the interpretive tradition. The 
first insight is that in any attempt at interpretation we are interpreting that which has 
already been interpreted. The object of our interpretation is a construct that we inherit from 
the historical layering of countless prior interpretations and re-interpretations. There is no 
blank page of history upon which we can inscribe our entirely original understandings. 
History is a palimpsest of layered inscriptions and layered commentaries. The second insight 
follows from the first. If all understanding is always already interpretation, then the 
interpreter is always already part of what is being interpreted. The subject that interprets is 
implicit in the object of interpretation. Notions of ‘objectivity’ and ‘neutrality’ as the 
privileged criteria of rationality become increasingly difficult to justify in the light of this 
second insight.  
 A third insight follows from the first two and was developed in particular by Hans-
Georg Gadamer. If all understanding is always already interpretation and the interpreter 
always already part of what is being interpreted, then all understanding necessarily involves 
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an element of self-understanding.  Gadamer elaborated this insight with reference to the 
notion of ‘application’, which he understood as being implicit in all understanding from the 
moment of its inception. It is not that understanding is achieved and then applied, but that the 
application is intrinsic to the process of understanding: ‘in all understanding an application 
occurs, such that the person who is understanding is himself or herself right there in the 
understood meaning. He or she belongs to the subject-matter that he or she is understanding 
... Everyone who understands something understands himself or herself in it’ (original 
emphases) (Gadamer, 2001, 47-48). The hermeneutical task, as Gadamer defines it, is to 
locate oneself within one’s own field – or, as he would put it, ‘tradition’ – of understanding. 
 
Jane: This insight that ‘he or she belongs to the subject-matter’ represents for me 
the very essence of action research. Being given permission to belong to the subject-
matter liberates the practitioner-researcher. As a teacher, what has meaning is what 
we can translate into real change in our professional lives.  As an early teacher-
researcher I was fascinated by the imagination; I was directed by supervisors to the 
testimonies of writers, philosophers, poets, biologists, artists, and their accounts of 
imagination. Yet the more I read, the less satisfying seemed to be my task. I 
withdrew from the PhD programme after two years instead of three, with a worthy 
dissertation that included several thousand references to others, but had no further 
value beyond the MPhil I was awarded. Years later I discovered action research: in 
other words, I was given the permission to ‘belong to my subject-matter’. I 
researched what imagination meant to me as a writer and teacher, how it impacted 
on my students and colleagues, how it could impact even more, in what ways it 
represented positive change, where there were conflicts and what to do about this.  It 
became my life-work. Belonging to our subject-matter is critical: without this we are 
indeed lost in the in-between spaces, talking to ourselves; but with it, we are making 
connections in the world.  
 
 The idea of ‘tradition’ is central to hermeneutics as developed by Gadamer: ‘we stand 
in traditions, whether we know these traditions or not; that is, whether we are conscious of 
these or are so arrogant as to think we can begin without presuppositions – none of this 
changes the way traditions are working on us and in our understanding’ (Gadamer, 2001, 45). 
Traditions pose questions in response to which we define ourselves and our own sense of 
purpose. The coherence of any tradition, as understood by Gadamer, can only be defined with 
reference to its intrinsic plurality and potential for innovation. Traditions are constantly 
evolving as new generations interpret and re-interpret them and, by so doing, modify and 
elaborate them. Traditions may initially present themselves to us as assertions, but, as 
Gadamer (1977, 11-13) insists, ‘no assertion is possible that cannot be understood as an 
answer to a question, and assertions can only be understood in this way ... The real power of 
hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable’.  
 Central to the argument of Gadamer’s (2004) Truth and Method is what he calls ‘the 
hermeneutic priority of the question’ (pp. 356-371). ‘Understanding begins’, as he puts it, 
‘when something addresses us. This is the first condition of hermeneutics’ (p. 298). In 
becoming receptive to that which addresses us we are opening ourselves to the question it 
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asks of us: ‘the essence of the question is to open up possibilities and keep them open’ (p. 
298) (original emphasis). Interpretation is the process whereby we receive the object of 
interpretation as a question. In clarifying and addressing that question the interpreter makes 
plain its meaning. Gadamer’s major contribution to the interpretive tradition is his insight into 
the dialogical nature of all interpretive acts. The inherent structure of that tradition, he argues, 
is that of question and answer.  
 
Andy: From my perspective as a researcher/activist seeking to intervene in the 
executive function of community development through co-production, I recognise 
that the interpretive tradition has some well-founded benefits and much to say about 
a hope for living together with difference. However, the operation of inquiry runs 
counter to the operation of tradition. And faith, the antithesis of enquiry, is the 
cornerstone of how tradition delivers the compliance to attitude and behaviour that 
is the advantage bred into it over eons of human/cultural evolution. This is perhaps 
at odds with Gadamer’s insistence that traditions are mutable. Reflecting on 
Gadamer’s statement that ‘the real power of hermeneutical consciousness is our 
ability to see what is questionable’, ought we not to ask: could it be that the real 
power of tradition is its capacity to blind us to that which is questionable? In 
considering what the interpretive tradition ‘requires of us’ is there not an onus on us 
to invite the faithful to enter into the conversation about what is questionable 
without challenging their faith in the unquestionable and what they see as the benefit 
that devotion brings? 
 
Horizon, prejudice and method 
Tradition as understood and developed by Gadamer is not a bounded and impermeable 
system. On the contrary, it is a dynamic process that is both open-ended and unpredictable. It 
is a kind of ongoing conversation. Indeed, conversation was, for Gadamer, not just a 
metaphor for the interpretive tradition as he understood it, but its very substance: the means 
by which ideas are sustained and transformed across generations. It is in the in-between of 
conversation that we make meaning, share understanding, and reconcile the strange and the 
familiar. Gadamer spent his life as a philosopher trying to make sense of this in-between 
space of human interchange. In doing so, he explored three major themes in particular: the 
fusion of horizons, the power of prejudice and the problem of method. 
 
The fusion of horizons 
Gadamer’s notion of ‘horizon’ relates directly to the importance he places in tradition as the 
legacy of the past to the future and the corresponding debt owed by the present to the past. In 
Truth and Method, Gadamer provides a general explanation of how and why he is using the 
concept: ‘The concept of “horizon” suggests itself because it expresses the superior breadth 
of vision that the person who is trying to understand must have. To acquire a horizon means 
that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand – not in order to look away from it but to 
see it better, within a larger whole and in true proportion’ (Gadamer, 2004, 304). The concept 
as applied by Gadamer invariably relates to our understanding of the past and of how we 
interpret the past with reference to the sources available to us. Gadamer’s central point on this 
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matter is that our horizons of understanding are never static: ‘Every historian and philologist 
must reckon with the fundamental non-definitiveness of the horizon in which his 
understanding moves. Historical tradition can be understood only as something always in the 
process of being defined by the course of events’ (ibid, 366). 
 The meaning to be derived from any act of interpretation is always in-between: 
between the interpreted and the interpreter, between the object of interpretation and the 
interpreter as subject, between different historical positions and perspectives. This means that 
the object of interpretation does not simply surrender its meaning as a form of divine 
revelation or authorial intention. Notwithstanding its historical roots in biblical exegesis, 
hermeneutics is in this respect both secular and humanist in its assumption that neither divine 
authority nor authorial intention provides the final arbiter in any interpretive act. There can be 
no appeal to a divine purpose that lies outside the historical course of events or to a human 
will that is immune to the consequences of those events.  
 The in-between nature of human understanding also means that interpretation is not 
simply imposed – as imported theory or pre-specified criteria – by the interpreter on the 
object of interpretation. Although the world is always already interpreted, every act of 
interpretation is a new beginning occasioning a necessary shift in the interpreter’s self-
understanding; or, as Joseph Dunne (1997, 121) puts it, ‘the interpreter’s horizon is already 
being stretched beyond itself, so that it is no longer the same horizon that it was 
independently of this encounter’.  Because both interpreter and interpreted are located in the 
process of history – in medias res – the horizon of interpretation can never achieve permanent 
fixity. It changes constantly, just as our visual horizon varies with each step we take: 
‘horizons are not rigid but mobile; they are in motion because our prejudgements are 
constantly put to the test’ (Gadamer, 2001, 48). Consequently, each interpretation is both 
unique and open to reinterpretation. Plurality is a defining feature of the interpretive field.  
 
The power of ‘prejudice’ 
What the interpreter brings to the process of interpretation is vitally important. We 
understand the world in relation to what we bring to it by way of prior assumptions, 
preconceptions, and prejudices. We understand the world in and through our experience of 
the world. This perspective, as Gadamer (2004, 271) puts it, ‘involves neither “neutrality” 
with respect to content nor the extinction of one’s self, but the foregrounding and 
appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices’. If we are an integral part of the 
world that we are seeking to understand, then we can ‘formulate the fundamental 
epistemological question for a truly historical hermeneutics as follows: what is the ground of 
the legitimacy of prejudices? What distinguishes legitimate prejudices from the countless 
others which it is the undeniable task of critical reason to overcome?’ (p. 278) Prejudice – our 
historicity – is where interpretation begins: ‘the concept of “prejudice” is where we can start’ 
(p. 273).  We bring with us to any attempt at interpretation prior values and assumptions that 
shape what and how we interpret. 
 Gadamer insists that this importing of ourselves into the process of understanding is a 
necessary component of that understanding. However, he also insists that we must be aware 
of what we are importing. Some of our prejudices may assist understanding, while others may 
distort or deny understanding. A large part of the hermeneutical task involves self-
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examination through the sifting of prejudices. To have trust in an interpretation is to trust that 
the interpreter has undergone this process of self-examination in respect of the values and 
assumptions that have shaped that interpretation. Similarly, to trust in one’s own interpretive 
capacity is not to have blind faith in one’s own convictions, but to trust in one’s own 
commitment to questioning those convictions. Trust is a necessary condition of understanding 
and understanding is a necessary condition of our being in the world.  If we trusted nothing in 
this world of ours, then it would be a world beyond our understanding – and a world beyond 
our understanding is no longer our world.  
 Gadamer is not arguing on behalf of relativism: an ethics of ‘anything goes’. Rather, 
he is arguing for an ethics of deliberation. He is arguing on behalf of mutuality and 
reciprocity as the conditions necessary for whatever shared understanding is necessary for 
being together. Understanding implies – and requires as a necessary condition – recognition 
of both selfhood and difference and of the necessary relation between the two. To seek to 
understand is to adopt an ethical stance – not a moralistic or moralising stance, but a stance 
which affirms the central importance of personhood (of the other and of the self). If our world 
is shaped by our understanding of it, and if that understanding is conditional upon our 
meeting of minds, then understanding is nothing if not ethical. The originality of Truth and 
Method lies in its injunction to overcome what Gadamer sees as the alienation implicit in the 
ideal of ‘prejudiceless’ objectivity: acknowledge the presence of yourself in your own 
understanding; recognise the other person’s understanding as central to your own 
understanding; develop your understanding as you would a dialogue. Above all, Gadamer 
insists, do not assume that human understanding can be reduced to method. That is not how 
human understanding works.  
 
Beyond method 
At the time when Gadamer was writing, ‘method’ was in the ascendancy.  The idea of 
‘method’ was particularly associated with scientific enquiry, but the idea of there being a pre-
ordained methodology of enquiry across disciplines and fields of study held sway. For 
enquiry to be taken seriously – whether within the natural, human, or social sciences – it had 
to be conducted systematically and in accordance with pre-specified methodological 
procedures. In its most extreme form this scientific positivism – buttressed by the 
philosophical presuppositions of logical positivism or logical empiricism as it is sometimes 
termed – claimed that observational evidence is indispensable for knowledge of the world 
and that only when supported by such evidence could a belief that such and such is the case 
actually be the case (i.e. be ‘true’). A methodical approach to the selection, gathering and 
analysis of empirical ‘data’ – and to the inferential process whereby ‘findings’ were derived 
from this approach – was and to a large extent still is the means by which scientific enquiry 
gained legitimacy and public recognition. ‘Method’ would enable one to gather and analyse 
‘data’ which would then provide knowledge in the form of ‘findings’. This became the 
dominant paradigm of scientific enquiry and exerted a strong influence on the social sciences 
generally and on social psychology in particular where it was supported by the 
presuppositions of behaviourism. 
 Gadamer’s starting point in Truth and Method is the ‘problem of method’ as he terms 
it. (Gadamer, 2004, 3-8). Understanding, he maintains, cannot be reduced to a method, 
 Page 7 of 14 
 
although interpretive methods may contribute to our understanding. Gadamer does not deny 
that there are methods, but denies that such methods are constitutive of human understanding: 
‘as tools, methods are always good to have’. But, he insists, we must understand where they 
can be fruitfully used if we are to avoid what he terms ‘methodical sterility’: [I]t is not their 
mastery of methods but their hermeneutical imagination that distinguishes truly productive 
researchers. And what is hermeneutical imagination? It is a sense of the questionableness of 
something and what this requires of us.’ (Gadamer, 2001, 41-42) 
 
Jonathan: Gadamer’s hermeneutical imagination resonates strongly with the 
philosophy that underpins the Stratus Writers Project, a participatory action research 
project working with university students on the autistic spectrum. Our project used 
autoethnographic narratives as a means of identifying unique insider knowledge 
about autism and experiences of higher education. Our research process aimed to be 
fully participatory, where data were collected, analysed and disseminated by the 
students themselves. 
 Gadamer’s invitation to meaningful conversation with traditions, phenomena 
and others has much import for participatory action research with students on the 
autistic spectrum whose ‘conditions’ and ‘disorders’ have often resulted in their 
being silenced. Jim Sinclair (1989) puts this well in his personal narrative ‘Bridging 
the Gaps’: ‘My credibility is suspect. My understanding of myself is not considered 
to be valid, and my perceptions of events are not considered to be based in reality. 
My rationality is questioned because, regardless of intellect, I still appear odd.’ 
 Sinclair’s critique reflects the historical reality, where discussing autism was 
the exclusive prerogative of clinicians and researchers and where autistic people 
were the objects of medical examination, rather than active participants in the 
creation of knowledge relating to their own experiences (Milton and Bracher, 2013). 
However, building on Gadamer’s challenge to ‘see what is questionable’ – in this 
case about autism – the Stratus Writers Project asserted that the autistic students 
themselves are authoritative and carry revealing wisdom about their own lives. By 
emphasising the participatory nature of the research process, ‘in-between’ spaces 
were identified and indeed celebrated; the lines between researcher and researched 
were blurred and the students’ collective experiences were explored as ‘first person 
plural accounts’ (Couser, 2000, 306).  
The analysis of the qualitative data by the students themselves might, in 
research terms, be considered the transgression of a boundary for some, yet for us it 
represented an opportunity to construct new and valid meanings in a humanising 
way. Megan, one of the participants, summed it up in her evaluation when she said, 
‘The greatest success from my point of view was having a voice. We weren’t 
treated like research subjects but research partners in the process…right from the 
beginning through to presenting at conferences.’   
 
 Implicit in Gadamer’s critique of method is the idea that understanding involves self-
formation and human flourishing that is open-ended in the extent and scope of its 
proliferation. The application of method, on the other hand, assumes a notion of rationality 
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that seeks closure and predictability. Human understanding, argues Gadamer, must be true to 
the nature of humanity: a humanity that is necessarily fragile and vulnerable by virtue of its 
complex interconnectivities and its uncertain relation to the future. Gadamer saw this as a 
struggle between the human and natural sciences, with the latter imposing an inappropriate 
methodology on the latter. But his analysis was such as to reframe the terms of the debate in 
ideological rather than methodological terms: the scientific method when inappropriately 
applied to the human world insists upon a particular version of humanity. Moreover, since the 
natural world is always already an interpreted world, the methodology derived from the 
natural sciences may be severely limited even when applied within its own traditional domain.  
 
Alison: Using narrative inquiry, I am interested in understanding the lived 
experience of delirium following a neurological event, from both the patient’s and 
carer’s perspective. My position both as a nurse and a researcher with a clinical 
background and an empirical ‘view’ of the research subject poses a methodological 
challenge. Whilst this priori experience was formative in shaping my initial research 
interests, I am conscious as to how I ‘situate’ myself in the research trajectory such 
that my personal constructs and assumptions as a nurse do not unduly influence both 
the researcher – participant relationship and the emerging dialogue.  I need to 
remain respectful of the primacy and immediacy of the participant’s narrative and 
whilst acknowledging that participant – researcher dynamics will exist, the 
utterances, descriptions and dialogue of the participants need to remain dominant 
and authentic. This methodological challenge between the relative merits of research 
methodologies and the pursuit of rigour and objectivity has been debated at length. 
However, Michael Crotty (1998, 17) rightly acknowledges that throughout the 
research journey, there is an inevitability that the assumption and ‘situatedness’ of 
the researcher will shape ‘for us the meaning of research questions and the 
purposiveness of research methodologies’. Indeed, as discussed by Christine 
Stephens (2011, 67) the interviewer is ‘not a neutral bystander and their direct 
contributions to shaping the narrative, as well as their representation of a broader 
social world in which the narrative is orientated, cannot be minimised or ignored’.  
      To remove the very essence of my practice experiences in an attempt to 
strengthen rigour and objectivity and lose a perspective of self appears not only 
naïve but unattainable. As Gadamer posits we already ‘belong to the tradition’, we 
already have a relationship with the case. My ‘situatedness’ and  relationship not 
only with patients but with the ‘life-world’ of nursing, the culture and tradition to 
which I belong should be viewed as an important contribution to the research and a 
valuable guide to enquiry, not a distraction or encumbrance.  
      For Gadamer, the position of the researcher is paramount, he is always located in 
a situation, and because we are inevitably influenced by a historical position, then 
the interpreter must adopt as Jon examines, a  ‘historical horizon’ whereby there is a 
conscious intention and acknowledgement of bias which may influence the 
interpretation. Gadamer refers to this as ‘consciousness of being affected by 
history’. An acknowledgement of these prejudices is necessary so that as Kitt 
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Austgard (2012, 830) posits ‘ the text, as another’s meaning, can be isolated and 
valued on its own’. Jon suggests that the very essence of the researcher is a powerful 
tool for interpretation – indeed, that we ‘understand the world in and through our 
experience of the world .... ‘  
      The iterative process within the hermeneutic process, defined by Douglas Ezzy 
(2002, 24) as ‘the art & science of interpretation’ actively engages the researcher in 
the interpretive process and recognises that an awareness of the researcher’s 
‘starting position’ as a sense-maker inevitably contributes to the research ends.  It is 
not that the a priori position which influences the interpretation but rather that a new 
meaning arising from the data analysis which may shift the overall understanding.  
      Reflexivity involves the realisation of an honest examination of the values and 
interests of the researcher that may impinge upon research work (Primeau, 2003). 
Constance T. Fischer’s (2009, 584) position is possibly more enviable in that in 
challenging the notion of objectivity recognises that ‘it is not possible to view 
without viewing from somewhere’. Indeed it could be argued that the prejudices of 
the researcher are in themselves a ‘view’ which inevitably bestows meaning and is 
the very source of our repertoire of knowledge. I believe the negative attribution of 
researcher ‘prejudice’ should be redefined and seen rather  as a positive influence on 
the explication of meaning derived in the interpretive paradigm. As a nurse I will 
inevitably bring knowledge and my own reality to this interpretive work, which I 
propose will undoubtedly shape the research questions and the very purpose of my 
work.  
 
‘… what this requires of us’ 
If we are to follow Gadamer’s metaphorical lead, we need to see humanistic enquiry as an 
ongoing conversation: a continuous process of question and answer. Among our interlocutors 
are both the living and the dead: the dead who still speak to us through the record of their 
words and deeds; the living who share our object of interest and enquiry. It is a conversation 
that may be conducted in company, but that is equally valid and worthwhile when conducted 
in solitude – what Hannah Arendt (1978), in her last great work on thinking, called ‘the two-
in-one’ of thought (pp.179-193). All thought, she argued, is dialogical in nature, which is 
why the experience of solitude is radically different from the experience of loneliness. 
‘Thinking’, she maintained, ‘is a solitary but not a lonely business; solitude is the human 
situation in which I keep myself company. Loneliness comes about when I am alone without 
being able to split up into the two in one, without being able to keep myself company’ 
(p.185). 
  
Andy: From a background of two decades of community development and activism, 
I find Gadamer's metaphorical lead, ‘to see humanistic enquiry as an ongoing 
conversation’ inspirational. And, indeed, my own work – seeking co-production 
between the users of social care and community services and the practitioners who 
design, manage and deliver them – has been committed to facilitating a '...living 
together with difference'. Crucial in this is, of course, what we (all) mean by 
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‘living’? And in the field I work in there is a clear difference between the 
motivations, operations and aspirations for outcome as enacted – even if not fully 
articulated – by different participants. In my world these are groups of participants 
we designate as service users and practitioners, who in turn are both tacitly and 
explicitly negotiating with managers, funders, regulators and, truth be known, 
me. What strikes me most about the challenge of forging '...the firm commitment to 
live together with difference' is my perception of a gap between what it is to inquire 
and what it is to apply the inquiry in our living. Perhaps this is an insurmountable 
gap – the tackling of which presents us with a Sisyphean challenge.  
 
 So, what is required of us on first entering the conversation? First, we require the 
courage and patience to listen to the other. Listening requires courage because so often it 
involves hearing what we don’t want to hear or what is difficult to wrap our heads round. It 
requires patience because listening – and reading with a listening mind – can be a long and 
hard slog. Reading, in particular, is crucial: being attentive to the words on the page and/or 
screen; persevering with what on first and even subsequent readings may appear difficult and 
unfamiliar; reading in such a way as to understand the text from its own historical 
perspective; reading inter-textually so as to understand the text in context; and, finally, 
interpreting the text with reference to our own contemporary concerns.  
 The crucial requirement in entering the conversation is to be attentive to what is being 
and has been uttered in both the written and spoken word. It is only by listening in on the 
ongoing conversation – the conversation ‘out there’ in the collective experience of thinking 
together and in the ‘two-in-one’ of solitary thought – that we can begin to understand what 
questions we want to pose, what questions we are being asked to address, and the terms and 
conventions within which those questions need to be framed. We can’t simply blunder into 
the conversation. We have to take stock of it – understand its parameters and emergent 
themes – and, crucially, identify our own interests within it: identify, that is, the particular 
question that the conversation asks of us and that we might want to ask of it. That question is 
our point of entry. 
 Let us suppose, then, that we have identified that question; that we have a sense of our 
starting point; that we have identified the origins of our enquiry. What now is required of us? 
I suggest that we require the determination and imagination to stay with the question, to 
refine and focus it, to sharpen it and apply it. Refining the question requires determination 
because it is a process rather than a single act or event. It requires imagination because it 
precedes though inference, guesswork and intuition. It is an ongoing process of question and 
answer. Only by refining the question can we understand the nature of the problem that is the 
object of our enquiry – an object that is only gradually revealed through this process of 
progressive focussing. The endpoint of this process of question and answer is not a definitive 
answer, but a defining question: a question so refined as to imply the parameters if not the 
substance of any response to it. 
  
Sue: What strikes me is the extent to which questions are at the root of experience 
and how much of my life as educator, researcher and poet is bound up with 
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questioning. Education is all about developing curiosity and, with that, the means 
to learn through discovery. If we give our students endless answers, we diminish 
their power to take an active role in their own learning - both in school and in their 
adult lives. Through my work in education, first as a Secondary school English 
teacher and latterly as a teacher educator and researcher, I have constantly 
encouraged young people and those at the beginning of their teaching careers to 
question, listen and reflect on their developing classroom practices as learners and 
teachers. I want them to take time and make space for these processes. They 
should be enabled to frame new questions through creative risk taking, through 
asking themselves, their peers and/or their students: how would it be I tried out this 
activity or if I wrote this line this way or if I read the text from that point of view? 
           I think they must learn to seize and twist the question kaleidoscope for 
themselves, to see new and endlessly reflecting patterns, to interrogate why a 
person has arrived at such an interpretation, whether it is better than theirs or just 
different and if it could help them to arrive at a new understanding. This breaking 
down of questions into smaller fragments is a fine art that many doctoral students 
are challenged by. On beginning their research they often appear adamant they 
know what they want to investigate and refuse to be distracted by other ideas. 
Nevertheless, only by redefining, refocusing, sharpening their questions will they 
productively engage in original research.  
 As Jon says, the interpreter is within the world in which they are 
questioning. However, the nature of an individual's questions (and thus their 
horizon) changes as the student, beginning teacher or researcher becomes further 
embedded within a particular world. As they grow in confidence they can begin to 
look beyond the obvious colour-pattern variations in order to explore the intricate 
traceries of light and shade in the far distance.  
 In writing poetry and researching the act of poetry writing, I am constantly 
questioning the nature of things around me in order to reinterpret what others have 
interpreted in a way that, I hope, will shed new light. For example, currently I am 
seeking to explore: why poets feel constrained by the demands of academic 
writing; how other passengers might react when someone invades their personal 
space; why a Blackbird sings in a particular way at twilight in Winter. In some of 
my poems, such as the poem 'Mass Observation', I have experimented with a form 
that solely consists of questions. In doing so, I am not trying to be cantankerous: I 
am simply trying to get closer to an understanding of how others might experience, 
and question, the world. 
What’s in your head? 
What dreams are you dreaming? 
What does night rain on the window feel like  
while your boy’s away at war? 
(Dymoke, 2012, 1) 
 
 The process of question and answer is endless – ‘in reality’, as (Gadamer, 2001, 60) 
puts it, ‘the last word does not exist’. But there does, of course, come a point when we decide 
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to give an account of ourselves – when, that is, we contribute publically to the debate through 
some form of publication or public address. What is required of us in giving such an account? 
The prime requirements are, to my mind, openness and magnanimity: openness in 
acknowledging that no-one – least of all one’s self – ever has the last word; magnanimity in 
recognising the value of alternative and possibly critical viewpoints and counter-arguments. 
These qualities suggest a style of reporting that focuses on provisional insights rather than 
proofs, dilemmas and concerns rather than resolutions, and frameworks for further thinking 
rather than definitive statements. The point of a conversation is not to win with a view to 
achieving closure, but to forestall closure with a view to achieving increased understanding. 
We must always – always – argue beyond the point of seemingly irreconcilable difference.  
  
Jonathan: Although challenging historical hegemony can be subversive and 
creative, it should be acknowledged that the essential ‘questionableness’ of things 
also urges us to act with humility. We participants of the Stratus Writers Project 
must recognise that our voices are only some among many and so we must also 
relinquish our claims to certainty in accepting the essential openness of our 
findings. Thus, it is through honest and reciprocal dialogue such as this that our 
knowledge about autism and what can make university better for autistic students 
can be reimagined and more ethical understandings made possible.  
 
That is not to say that difference can be transcended or overcome in the interests of 
some over-arching unity – whether defined in spiritual, essentialist or absolutist terms. 
Difference is real and must be recognised. It is only through the recognition of difference that 
we can live together. We live together in difference or not at all. That is why we must seek to 
understand that which we choose to criticise. We can only criticise with honesty what we 
have fully received; the quality of our criticism depends upon the quality of our receptivity. 
To criticise without first opening ourselves to that which we are criticising is a particularly 
pernicious – and increasingly prevalent – form of philistinism. When we ‘go public’ we very 
often position ourselves critically in relation to others and, in turn, receive criticism from 
those against whom we have positioned ourselves. That is how the conversation works. But it 
only works well insofar as we genuinely seek to understand prior to engaging in critique.  
 Hermes – the go-between in our world of in-between – is having a particularly hard 
time at the moment. Dashing between Hebron and Jerusalem, Damascus and Homs, the 
Ukraine and Crimea, etc., our god of transitions and boundaries is undoubtedly under 
considerable strain. He is witnessing us mortals kill and maim ourselves with wilful abandon. 
Hermes also has to contend with the superpowers and their internal wrangling – for example, 
the ‘tea party’ squabbling in the US and the coalition tiffs in the UK. Ours is an 
incontrovertibly agonistic world. Nothing now is more important than the understanding of 
difference and the firm commitment to living together with difference. The interpretive 
tradition – as I have tried to elaborate it – is much more than a scholarly outpost of Western 
philosophy. It is our only hope of living together. It is the only space left. The interpretive 
tradition has much to teach us.  
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Jane: I am in warm agreement with Jon that Nothing now is more important than 
the understanding of difference and the firm commitment to living together with 
difference. The Old Testament has a notion that human beings themselves create the 
conditions for a Golden Age: it is not a place, but a state, and not freely ‘given’ but 
earned by each of us. To navigate in-between spaces with an open heart is our 
challenge. In 1973 the reform rabbi Jonathan Magonet opened a symposium that 
brought Jews, Christians and Moslems together into open dialogue. This 
symposium, intended as a one-snapshot event, at the time of writing now enters its 
42nd year. He writes: ‘The complexity of modern civilization is a daily lesson in the 
necessity of not pressing any claim too far, of understanding opposing points of 
view, of seeking to reconcile them, of conducting matters so that there is some kind 
of harmony in a plural society’ (Magonet, 2003, 16). Why this paper of Jon’s is so 
deeply resonant for me, is that it has dared to connect what we do as writers, 
researchers, and thinkers, with what we do in the wider world, and with the belief 
and hope that this connection can make a positive difference.  
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